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COMBATTING UNNECESSARY FAMILY
SEPARATION: HOW TO SEEK COURT-ORDERED
HOUSING FOR FAMILIES IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA NEGLECT SYSTEM
Justine A. Dunlap* and Kenneth Zimmerman*
L

INTRODUCrION AND OVERVIEW

The lack of adequate and affordable housing severely hinders homeless and
near-homeless families' in the District of Columbia's child abuse and neglect
system (neglect system) 2 as these families try to remain intact or become reunited

* Ms. Dunlap is a Staff Attorney with the Counsel for Child Abuse and Neglect at the D.C. Superior
Court, where she trains and advises attorneys practicing abuse and neglect law. Ms. Dunlap is co-author of
the Practice Manual for Child Abuse and Neglect Cases In the District of Columbia.
** Mr. Zimmerman began work on this article while a staff attorney with the Washington Legal Clinic
for the Homeless in Washington, D.C. He is currently a trial attorney in the Housing and Civil Enforcement
Section of the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division.
The views expressed in this article are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Washington
Legal Clinic, D.C. Superior Court, or the United States. The authors gratefully acknowledge the research.
drafting, and advocacy efforts of Elizabeth Oppenheim and Jonathan Harwitz.
1. For purposes of this article, near-homeless families are defined as those who lack. or who are at
imminent risk of lacking, a formal possessory interest in their dwelling. This includes those sharing living
quarters with one or more other families, and those who have received, or are about to receive, an eviction
notice.
2. The neglect system refers to the system set out in Titles 6 and 16 of the D.C. Code that governs how
the District of Columbia's judicial system handles cases of children who are alleged to be neglected. The
Family Division of the D.C. Superior Court initially adjudicates whether a child has been neglected and then
supervises the child's placement, including the provision of remedial services to the family. The term neglect is
a comprehensive one that has seven separate statutory definitions, including abuse. DC CoDE ANN- § 162301(9) (1981).
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after a period of separation. The absence of suitable shelter creates immense
pressure that can exacerbate existing family problems or by itself lead to and
perpetuate court-ordered separation.
Both local and federal law provide valuable legal tools to assist these families.
The District's Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act 3 (PCANA) in
conjunction with the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980'
(AAA) require that the District government provide families with services that
will permit them to remain together or be reunited whenever possible. Trial courts
in the District of Columbia have joined other courts across the country in ordering
housing as one of the services required by the PCANA and similar state statutes.
This article discusses the legal and factual bases for the court-ordered provision
of housing to families in the District of Columbia neglect system. It first explains
the relevant statutory provisions of the PCANA and its legislative history
authorizing D.C. Superior Court judges to order the provision of housing.' Next,
the article explores the nexus between the AAA and housing requests, including
discussion of case law in other jurisdictions.
The final section notes that most families in the neglect system lack affordable
housing, and it then focuses upon the extensive number of vacant public housing
units in the District of Columbia. The article suggests that the existence of these
vacancies supports the grant of housing to families in the neglect system for two
reasons. First, these families are entitled to priority under federal and local law.
Second, other housing options such as emergency shelters do not satisfy the
government's obligation under the PCANA and the AAA.
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY

A.

Preliminary Considerations

Traditionally, counsel file housing motions only after every other goal in a
neglect case has been accomplished and the lack of housing remains the sole
impediment to reunification of families. While waiting until all issues but housing
3. Id. § 16-2301 et seq.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620 et seq., 670 et seq. (1980). Child welfare advocates routinely refer to this statute
as P.L. 96-272.
5. Housing refers to either the provision of the actual housing unit or the financial assistance to procure
private housing.
6. See discussion of preference system in housing infra § Ill(D), p. 39.
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are resolved may be a valid strategic decision, it is not a legal prerequisite to the
relief sought in a housing motion.
It may also be appropriate to file a housing motion when a parent is making
progress, but has not completed all the required tasks to regain custody of the
children, e.g, counseling, parenting classes, visitation, or when further progress
cannot be made until housing is in place. Housing is the most basic of needs,
without which even the most stable individual would have trouble functioning. It is
unrealistic to expect persons in a time of crisis to get a job, seek counseling, visit
their children, and stabilize their lives, only then to be "rewarded" with housing.
B. D.C. Law
1. Primary Statutory Authority and Supporting Case Law
D.C. Code § 16-2320(a), a provision of the PCANA, contains the primary
authority for a D.C. Superior Court judge to order housing. It provides:
If a child is found to be neglected, the [Family] Division [of the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia] may order any of the following dispositions
which will be in the best interest of the child: ....

(5) ....

The Division shall

have the authority to (i) order any public agency of the District of Columbia
to provide any service the Division determines is needed and which is within
such agency's legal authority and (ii) order any private agency receiving
public funds for services to families or children to provide any such services
when the Division deems it in the best interests of the child and within the
scope of the legal obligations of the agency.
In re D.L,7 the first trial court decision granting housing, cited this dispositional8
provision as the statutory authority to order housing. The court found that the
Department of Public and Assisted Housing (DPAH) is a public agency of the
District of Columbia and that the provision of public housing is within the scope of
DPAH authority.

The dispositional authority granted in § 16-2320 does not cease after the
original disposition hearing. Indeed, this provision authorizes a multitude of

7. 113 Wash. L. Rep. 1293 (June 26, 1985).
8. The disposition is the hearing at which, after a child has been adjudicated neglected, the court
determines the placement of the child and the services necessary to achieve the case goal.
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dispositional alternatives, including one that rarely, if ever, occurs at the original
disposition hearing.9 In addition, D.C. Code § 16-2323(d), which governs review
hearings, authorizes the court to order any disposition allowed under § 2320(a) in
cases where it determines that the child's commitment to the Department of
Human Services is no longer needed to safeguard the child's welfare. Although the
statute explicitly confers this power only in cases in which commitment is no
longer deemed necessary, PCANA's legislative history confirms that § 2323(d)
"provides that the court has the same disposition alternatives at review hearings
as it had at the time of the original disposition."'1
The legislative history of § 16-2320(a)(5) provides further support for the idea
that court-ordered housing is not beyond the scope or intention of that statutory
provision. The Council emphasized that the provision is intended to
clarify that the [Family] Division [of the Superior Court] may order specific
dispositions and services that it deems to be in the best interests of the child
so long as they are not beyond the legitimate authority of the agency or
agencies providing service in any particular case."'
In In re D.L, the court undertook a statutory analysis and concluded that it had
the authority to order the District to provide housing. After reviewing § 162320(a)(5), § 6-2121, and § 6-2123(b), it held that the court has the authority to
order the District of Columbia's agencies to provide housing or, in the alternative,
financial resources to obtain housing, to reunite the family. 12 The court also
examined the AAA and noted that "the federal statute . . . mandates the same
kinds of efforts mandated by the Child Abuse Act of 1977 and the clear language
of § 16-2320(a)(5)."' 3
Since In re D.L, there have been several other written opinions granting housing
motions. In In re L.Y.,' 4 the court explicitly followed the reasoning of In re D.I.,
and held that it had the authority to order housing under § 16-2320(a)(5). The

9. D.C. Code § 16-2320(a)(6) provides that a termination of parental rights (TPR) is a dispositional
alternative. In almost all instances, a TPR occurs at least six months after a child is adjudicated neglected.
10. REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FROM THE COMN1TTES ON T11E
JUDICIARY, Title IV, Bill 2-48, p. 22 (March 29, 1977) (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 20.
12. In this instance, the public housing authority chose to provide a public housing unit.
13. 113 Wash. L. Rep. at 1298.
14. N-176-82 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 19, 1991)(Greene, J.) (unpublished memorandum order available
from D.C. Law Review).
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L.Y. court was also persuaded by the findings of the United States District Court
in LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 5 wherein the federal court found that children stay in
the District of Columbia's foster care system twice as long as the national average, due in part to the District's failure to provide the necessary services to enable
reunification.' 6 Finally, the court in L.Y. stated that "[i]t is well past the time that
the District should have ceased devoting its resources to explaining

. . .

why it

cannot fulfill its legal responsibilities in this case and redirected those resources
towards compliance with the law and the provision of resources that will permit
reunification . .

.

In re T.B. and Y.B.' is the most recent written opinion on the issue. In that case
the court stated that it clearly has the authority to order housing, but suggested
that this "extraordinary relief" should be used sparingly.
2. Secondary Statutory Authority
Section 16-2320(a)(5) establishes the basic authority to order housing. Woven
throughout the neglect statute, furthermore, are provisions that emphasize the
obligation to provide the services necessary to preserve or achieve family unity.
This pervasive legislative concern for family preservation supplements the specific
authority to order housing found in § 16-2320(a)(5). In addition, these secondary
provisions underscore that the broad authority found in § 16-2320(a)(5) is not an
aberration but rather part of a larger statutory scheme.
Several provisions emphasize that keeping a child in the home is an over-arching
statutory goal. Section 16-2310(b)(3) forbids the placement of the child in foster
care before the neglect adjudication unless "no alternative resources or
arrangements are available to the family that would adequately safeguard the
child without requiring removal." Section 16-2320 also states that it is "presumed"
to be "generally preferable to leave a child in his or her own home."
Title 6, which governs the operations of the Department of Human Services
(DHS) Child and Family Services Division"9 (CFSD), stresses reunification as well

15. 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In La Shawn A., the court found violations of the statutory rights
of the children involved in D.C.'s foster care system and declared that the children had a private right of
action to enforce "obligations imposed on DHS by local statutes and regulations." Id. at 1326.
16. Id. at 968.
17. In re L.Y., N-176-82 at 9.
18. No. 468-88 & 469-88 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 1992) (Alprin, J.)(unpublished memorandum
opinion available from D.C. Law Review).
19. CFSD is the division within DHS that is statutorily charged with responsibility for, among other
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as family preservation. Section 6-2121(a)(4)(c) states that the agency shall
provide the "family" with services aimed at "reuniting the family as quickly as
possible." This section speaks of the "family" of the child, not merely parents, and
thus could support a housing request for a non-parent family member who is
currently providing or is willing to provide care for the child.
Section 6-2123(b)(3) provides that the agency shall "establish or attempt to
secure priority access" for "services necessaryfor the preservation or reunification
offamilies." (emphasis added). Sections 6-2123 and -2124 set forth non-exclusive
lists of services that the agency is authorized to provide. These services include, for
example, family shelters, emergency caretakers, and counseling services. In
LaShawn A., 2 0 the federal district court found that CFSD's lack of priority access
agreements with other agencies contributed to the city's failure to use reasonable
efforts to prevent foster care placement as required by 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq.
Title 6 also authorizes DHS to provide families involved in the child welfare
system with financial assistance.2 1 Section 6-2107(b) specifically requires the
agency to arrange for "necessary financial services ... to the child and the child's
family in a manner which maintains the child in his or her home." 22 This statutory
reference to "financial services" establishes that the provision of financial
assistance constitutes a "service" and thus falls squarely within the dispositional
authority found in §16-2320(a)(5).
A request for housing assistance, either through financial aid or a housing unit,
will often be cost effective. In most cases, the District will save the cost of foster
care payments that are at a minimum $437 per child per month.23 In addition, a
housing order would allow a child to return home from foster care, thus freeing up
much-needed foster care placements. The chronic shortage of foster care

things, safeguarding the rights of children and providing services to children and families. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 6-2121 etseq. (1981).
20. 762 F. Supp. at 970.
21. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2123(b)(3)(1981)(DHS Director shall establish or attempt to secure priority
access to "emergency financial aid"); Id. § 6-2124(a)(1) (authorizing Chief of Division to provide "emergency
financial aid"); Id. § 6-2107(b)(1) ("arranging for necessary .. .financial services").
22. See also In re D.I., 113 Wash. L. Rep. at 1298 (ordering District to provide financial resources as
alternative to public housing).
23. The District currently pays $437 a month for each child under twelve and $526 for each older child.
Additional monthly amounts are added to the base rate if the child has special needs. Those rates average $81
for special board rates, $161 for a handicapped child, and $330 for a child with multiple handicaps, See
Memorandum to Vincent Gray, DHS Director, from Clarice Walker, Acting Commissioner, Commission on
Social Services (April 21, 1992) (available from D.C. Law Review).
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placements is well documented, and the LaShawn A. remedial order 2 ' requires the
District to ensure that no more than three foster children are placed with a single
family.
C.

The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980

1. Overview
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 198025 is remedial federal
legislation that was enacted to address the problem of excessive use of foster care.
Under the AAA, states receive federal foster care matching funds only when there
has been a judicial finding28 "that, in each case, reasonable efforts [were] made
(A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the
need for removal of the child from [the] home .... "2
The reasonable efforts finding is usually made first at the Initial Appearance
when the government is seeking removal of the child from the home. If removal is
ordered, the government will ask the judge to sign "supplemental findings" that
reasonable efforts have been made. 28 This reasonable efforts requirement is
ongoing and, accordingly, the agency must continue to make reasonable efforts to
reunify the family after placement has occurred.29 The AAA was enacted with the
hope that excessive and unnecessary foster care placements would be avoided by
providing federal funds only when states had shown that they had made efforts to
avoid removal.
The D.C. statute, enacted before the passage of the AAA, does not contain the
phrase "reasonable efforts." Much of its language and spirit, however, emphasizes
the same goal of maintaining the family intact. D.C. Superior Court Neglect
Rules enacted after the passage of the AAA adopt the reasonable efforts language,
thus explicitly demonstrating the compatibility of federal and local law. 30
24. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991).
25. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620 et seq. and 670 el seq.
(1982)).
26. 42 U.S.C. 672(a)(1).
27. 42 U.S.C. 671(a)(15).
28. Often this finding is pro forma and is done without evidence or a proffer of what efforts have been
made.
29. 42 U.S.C. 671(a)(15) also provides that reasonable efforts must be made "tomake it possible for a
child to return" home after removal.
30. Superior Court Neglect Rule 12(f) provides that a pre-trial order placing a child in foster care must
include a determination that the District made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for remoeal
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2. Suter v. Artist M.
In the decade since the AAA was passed, advocates have initiated a substantial
amount of successful litigation based upon the reasonable efforts requirement in
the AAA to get the necessary services for families and children. They brought
much of this litigation in federal court, relying upon the principle that the AAA
created enforceable rights. On March 25, 1992, however, the U.S. Supreme Court,
in Suter v. Artist M.,31 ruled that the AAA does not create a federal private right
of action to enforce the reasonable efforts provision. The Court concluded that the
statute authorized the reduction or elimination of federal funding for foster care as
the appropriate enforcement mechanism.
Although this decision limits the use of the federal courts to get children and
families in the child welfare system the assistance they need, it in no way
invalidated the provisions of the AAA. Therefore, the state, in those cases in which
it is seeking federal reimbursement, must still make reasonable efforts to prevent
removal or to reunify a family once it has been separated. Moreover, Suter does
not undercut the reasoning of In re D.La2 In re D.L and its progeny grant relief
founded on local law applied in the context of a state-initiated action. Thus, D.C.
Superior Court decisions granting housing in neglect cases bear no resemblance to
the federal private causes of action invalidated by Suter.
Post-Suter advocates can still argue effectively that providing housing is a part
of the reasonable efforts required by federal law and local rule. The AAA
reasonable efforts requirement is a continuing obligation; therefore, in cases in
which reunification could occur if housing is provided, a failure to provide housing
is not reasonable. Accordingly, in such cases the court should enter a finding that
reasonable efforts were not made.
3. Determining Reasonable Efforts
The relevant language of the AAA states that:
In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a
plan approved by the Secretary which (15) [p]rovides that, in each case,
reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster

or that the child's removal is required regardless of any services that could be provided.
31,
-U.S
112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
32. 113 Wash. L. Rep. 1293 (June 26, 1985).
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care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home,
and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home.33
Although the Act does not define "reasonable efforts," its language, the
legislative history, and the relevant federal regulations' demonstrate that the
reasonable efforts mandate requires agencies to provide a wide range of services to
preserve family integrity.3 5 In any given case, housing may be among the services
necessary to fulfill the duty to make reasonable efforts.31
The following three-step process is useful in determining whether the state has
made reasonable efforts: (1) identifying the exact danger that puts the child at risk
of placement and that justifies state intervention; (2) determining how the family
problems are causing or contributing to this danger to the child; and (3) designing
and providing services for the family that alleviate or diminish the danger to the
child. By applying this analysis in situations where the lack of housing is the
danger (or one of the dangers) identified, one may find the provision of housing is
37
a part of the state's reasonable efforts obligation.
4. Applying the AAA to Housing Motions
The District neglect statute, standing alone, provides ample authority for a court.
to order housing in a neglect case. A hesitant judge, however, may take comfort in
learning that a housing order is not a radical measure and indeed is supported by
the federal legislation. Both statutes seek to accomplish the goal of family unity
through the provision of services to ameliorate the problems that lead to the
separation of families.
The AAA may be helpful to support a pre-disposition request for housing

33. 42 US.C. § 671(a)(15) (emphasis added).
34. 45 C.F.R. § 1357.15(e)(2) (1990).
35. Like the federal statute, most of the 24 state statutes that require a reasonable efforts determination
in the course of child welfare proceedings do not provide a more precise definition of the term. The Minnesota
statute provides the most explicit guidance by defining reasonable efforts as "the exercise of due diligence by
the responsible social service agency to use appropriate and available services to meet the needs of the child
and the child's family." MINN. STAT. § 260.012(b) (Supp. 1990). As can be seen in this more elaborate
definition, the term "reasonable efforts" cannot be defined precisely since it depends upon the needs of a
particular family and will shift depending upon the specific family at issue.
36. See In Re S.A.D., 555 A.2d 123 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1989); Martin A. v. Gross. 524 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1987).
37. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten Years Later 26 CAt.
W.L REv. 223 (1989-1990).
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because the reasonable efforts obligation attaches when the child is first removed
from the home. The broad mandate of the AAA to employ reasonable efforts "to
prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child" applies at all times "prior
to the placement of a child in foster care."38 There is also local law to support a
pre-dispositional request, as DHS responsibility to provide services to maintain or
preserve family unity contained in Title 6 is not limited to disposition or postdisposition proceedings.3 9 Indeed, one Superior Court judge has entered a pre-trial
order that DHS provide financial assistance necessary to obtain private housing. 40
a.

Local Caselaw

The D.C. Court of Appeals has addressed the AAA in only one case. In In re
D.G., 4' the Court of Appeals held, in an opinion affirming a termination of
parental rights order, that the AAA did not confer standing on a parent to argue
that the reasonable efforts requirement of the AAA had not been fulfilled. The
court also found that the AAA did not grant the mother a private right of action
to enforce its provisions because the remedy for a violation of the AAA was to
withhold federal reimbursement. To some degree, In re D.G. presaged Suter in
that it found no cause of action at a time when nearly every other court deciding
the issue was taking the opposite position. It is nonetheless a narrow holding,
dealing only with a retroactive challenge to a termination of parental rights.
b. Other Jurisdictions
Before Suter v. Artist M., there were many decisions from courts in other
jurisdictions finding that a failure to provide housing assistance constituted a
failure to meet the reasonable efforts requirement. Although some were based on
the private cause of action theory and, accordingly, were overruled by Suter,
others relied on state law as well as the AAA and remain valid following Suter.
In Martin A. v. Gross,4 2 the court held that New York City's failure to provide

38. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).
39. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2123(b)(3) (1981) (DHS responsibility to establish or secure priority
access to services necessary to family preservation or reunification); Id. § 6-2124 (authority to provide or
secure any necessary services).
40. In re L.D. and J.D., N-277-91 & N-375-91 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 2,1992)(Mize, J.). This one-page
order has not been published (available from D.C. Law Review).
41. 583 A.2d 160 (D.C. 1990).
42. 524 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1987).
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housing assistance and other services to parents with children in foster care, as
required by the state's preventive services law, the AAA, and fundamental
constitutional principles, entitles parents to injunctive relief requiring the city to
develop and implement a plan of services. The court stated that limited resources
and "alleged" shortage of staff were not a sufficient justification for the denial of
services.
In In re Enrique R.,13 the court ordered the state social service agency to take
an active role in finding housing for the paternal grandmother so that her grandson
could be removed from foster care and placed in her custody. Citing Social Service
Law § 392(9), which requires "that such agency assist the parent in obtaining
adequate housing", the court said that the assistance need not be confined to
"writing letters or making telephone calls," but rather should include legal action
to get the grandmother a preference for public housing tenant selection. 4 ' The
court noted further that the grandmother had applied for public housing years
earlier and was unlikely to get housing without a preference before the child, then
six years of age, reached adolescence.
In In re Nicole G.,45 the Rhode Island Supreme Court ordered the state
Department for Children and Their Families to provide housing assistance-in the
form of rental subsidies-to families for whom reunification is in the child's best
interest. The court rejected a series of arguments advanced by the Department,
including that the state law, G.L. 1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 15-7-7, did not
expressly authorize the court to order housing. The court declared that it had the
power to make orders designed to effect reunification, provided that reunification
was in the children's best interest.'6 In addition, the court found puzzling the
Department's contention that providing housing would be a diversion from "its
primary mission of preserving and unifying families.""', Housing assistance was
ordered, the court explained, for the express purpose of achieving reunification.
In Hansen v. Department of Social Services, 8 the court found that the state
child welfare law requiring the provision of emergency shelter care should be read
broadly to include assisting intact, homeless families. Accordingly, it struck down
a regulation that limited emergency shelter care to cases in which children had to
be removed from their homes immediately. Such a requirement, the court said,
43. 494 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Fam. Ct. 1985).
44. Id. at 803.
45. 577 A.2d 248 (R.I. 1990).
46. Id. at 251.
47. Id. at 250.
48. 193 Cal. App. 3d 283, 238 Cal. Rptr. 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1987).
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subverted the purpose of the laws to provide "appropriate aid and services" to all
49
needy and distressed persons.

Ill.

THE SHELTER AND HOUSING SYSTEMS:

BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR HOUSING MOTIONS

A. Introduction
In arguing a housing motion, counsel should emphasize four points about the
District's private and subsidized housing market: 50
(1) homeless and near-homeless families in the District of Columbia neglect
system cannot afford housing in the private market;
(2) the District's temporary shelter program does not satisfy the District's
obligation to reunite families;
(3) families in the neglect system often do not receive subsidized housing even
though federal and District law mandate that they receive the highest possible
preference; and,
(4) the District has the resources to provide permanent housing to these
families, particularly through the more than 2,200 vacant public housing units for
which it has received, but not used, millions of dollars in federal rehabilitation
funds.
B.

The D.C. Private Housing Market and the Low Income Renter

Families in the neglect system have little chance of finding private permanent
housing because they receive insufficient -income from public assistance and/or
their low-wage jobs. Many homeless and near-homeless families in the District's
neglect system receive income from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program. For a family of three with no other income, the AFDC grant of
$409 per month5" falls more than $300 short of meeting rental costs for a one-

49. Id. at 292.
50. Subsidized housing refers to programs such as public housing that charge rent based upon a
percentage of the tenant's income, typically 30 percent, rather than what the market will bear. See discussion
infra § Ill(D).
51. US. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. FAMILY SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION,
SCHEDULE OF NEED AND PAYMENT AMOUNTS (March 17, 1993). See also CENTER FOR BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES. NEW BUDGET REDUCES ALREADY INADEQUATE AFDC BENEFITS 1, 3 (April 24, 1991)
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bedroom apartment at the Fair Market Rent (FMR) and nearly $450 short of the
cost of a two-bedroom apartment. 52 A parent working full-time at the minimum
wage similarly cannot afford the rent of these modest apartments. He or she earns
approximately $650 a month compared to the FMR of $725 for a one-bedroom
apartment and $854 for a two-bedroom unit."5
Repeated housing studies confirm that AFDC and other low-income families are
unlikely to find affordable housing in the District of Columbia. A 1985 survey
undertaken by the Census Bureau and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) found 142,000 low-income renters in the District but only
50,400 units that are affordable for this group." A 1989 District study determined
that as a result of this shortage over 31,000 households or twenty percent of the
District's population do not have their own residence but share quarters with a
second family. "5 Similarly, more than 11,300 families are on the District's waiting
5
list for federally subsidized housing " and their average wait is seven years.7
C.

The Inadequacy of Emergency Shelter as Housing

The inability of homeless and near-homeless families in the neglect system to
find adequate permanent housing in the private market may force them to seek
emergency temporary shelter. In the District of Columbia, emergency shelter for
families is provided primarily by the District government and supplemented by a
few private providers. As administered by the District of Columbia Office of

[hereinafter "NEw BUDGET"] (available from D.C. Law Review). The S409 payment for a family of three
yields an annual income of S5,136-47% of the federal poverty level. It equals just 57% of the amount that
the District itself has calculated as necessary to purchase essentials for a family of three including food.
clothing, and shelter. Id. at 2.
52. HUD Schedule B-Fair Market Rents For Existing Housing, 57 Fed. Reg. 45468, 45477 (Oct. 1.
1992). The FMR in a locality is established by the Department of Housing and Urban Development based
upon a survey of rents within the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).
53. Id.
54. See NEW BUDGET, supra note 51, at 3. Low income is defined here as those with annual incomes
below $10,000. Apartments considered affordable for this population had rents no more than S250 p.r month,
or 30% of a 510,000 income.
55. DisTRicT OF COLUMBIA STUDY. DoUBLED-Up HOUSEHOLDS 5 (1989) (available from D.C. Law
Review).
56. Attachment to Letter from Ray Price, Director of DPAH, to C. W. Hargro'e Chairperson of ANC
2D, 4 (Sept. 14, 1992)(11,396 applicants on waiting list).
57. DIsTRIcT OF COLUMBIA CoMNI'N ON BUDGET AND FINANCIAL Ptonmts. Co.0t%o. PUL WoaRKs
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. ISSUE ANALYSIS-

MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF PuoLic HOUSING

AND RENT SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 115 (available from D.C. Law Review).
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Emergency Shelter and Support Services (OESSS), the District program utilizes
shelters operated largely through contracts to non-profit providers and for-profit
motels.
The emergency shelters that are part of the District system are governed by
District statutes and regulations"8 that control the terms and conditions under
which a family may stay in the shelter, including the permissible length of stay
and grounds for expulsion. Following the 1990 repeal of the District's entitlement
to shelter,5 the District significantly curtailed the program. It obtained authority
to reduce the overall number of shelter beds by more than fifty percent 0 and to
limit the length of stay in shelter to ninety days for families and thirty days for
single people. These restrictions only apply to emergency shelters funded and/or
operated by the District government and thus do not apply to private shelters such
as those operated by the Community for Creative Non-Violence.
Especially given the recent cutbacks, the District's emergency shelter program
does not satisfy local and federal statutory requirements that the District provide
necessary services to maintain family unity.61 As an initial matter, emergency
shelters provide only temporary housing rather than the stable environment
necessary for families to avoid separation. As noted above, the newly enacted
ninety-day limitation upon the length of stay of shelter residents means that
shelters are, now more than ever, an interim measure. 62 Moreover, the conditions
in District shelters are frequently unsuitable for all families and specifically for
those attempting to avoid court-ordered separation. 63 As detailed in recent
58. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3-602.1 et seq. and § 3-206.3 (1981 & Supp. 1992); 39 D.C. Reg. 470 (to be
codified at D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29 § 2500 et seq.).
59. The D.C. Emergency Overnight Shelter Amendment Act of 1990, D.C. Law 8-197 § 2(b), 37 D.C.
Reg. 4815 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-602 (1981 & Supp. 1992)), repealed portions of a
1984 citizen initiative (Initiative 17) that established a right to shelter. This law became effective on March 6,
1991.
60. The FY 1993 Budget indicates a reduction in the number of single shelter beds from 1,700 to 900
and in the number of spaces for families from over 500 to 265 (citation available from D.C. Law Review).
61. See discussion supra § II(A).
62. Under the current law, families may stay in District shelter for only 90 days in any 12-month period
and are limited to a single 30-day extension. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-610 (1981 & Supp. 1992); D.C. Mun.
Regs. tit. 29, § 2506.1. Even though D.C. Code § 3-610 does not limit the number of extensions, DHS
regulations allow a single 30-day extension and only if: (I) a family is unable to secure permanent housing
despite its best efforts; or (2) the health or safety of the homeless persons' children could be endangered. 39
D.C. Reg. 478 (to be codified at D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 2505.4).
63. In a case brought by homeless families in the District System, Judge Richard Levie in a 73-page
preliminary injunction decision found that children living in the District's motel-type shelters were suffering
irreparable harm. See Fountain v. Barry. No. 90-CA1503 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 1990)(available from
D.C. Law Review). While this decision has been vacated because of the repeal of Initiative 17, supra note 59,
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research, homeless families placed in emergency shelters suffer significant adverse
physical and psychological consequences."
By permitting families in the District's neglect system to remain in emergency
shelters, the District is not operating consistently with its obligation under
PCANA to insure that neglected children and their families receive effective social
services to promote their physical and social health and to reestablish a wholesome
family unit.
D.

The Preference System in Subsidized Housing

The notion that the housing needs of a neglect family will be unfairly elevated
above the needs of others is a frequent issue voiced by both the government and
the judges. A clear response to this concern is that both the federal government
and the District have already recognized the needs of families in foster care and
have accorded to them a preference in obtaining subsidized housing. Thus the
relief requested in a housing motion is not only consistent with, but actually
furthers, federal and local legislative mandates.
Subsidized housing refers principally to two separate programs, public housing
and Section 8 housing, both authorized by the United States Housing Act
(USHA).6 5 These programs enable recipients to pay no more than thirty percent of
their income for permanent housing. With public housing, the recipient lives in
units operated and owned by the District's Department of Public and Assisted
Housing and largely funded by HUD. In the Section 8 program, the household
receives a voucher or certificate for use in the private rental market that caps the

the court's findings are a graphic illustration of the conditions in the District shelters.
64. See Bassuk, E., M.D., Homeless Children: A Neglected Population, AMEn J OF
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 57(2) (April 1987). In a leading case involving families threatened with separation due to
the lack of housing, Dr. Bassuk testified:
It is apparent that children suffer from the extremely stressful situation of being homeless. Th= children
manifest symptoms of dire psychological distress. The most common symptoms are associated vith severe
anxiety and depression. Moreover, a greatly disproportionate number of homeless children are failing to
develop normally .... The parents in homeless families also bear the marks of a desperate existence.
They most commonly suffer from severe depression and anxiety. There are reasons to fear that
homelessness is causing permanent psychological injury to families.
Affidavit of Dr. Bassuk, Hansen v. Dept. of Social Services, 193 Cal. App. 3d 283, 238 Cal. Rptr. 232 (Cal.
App. 2d Dist. 1987) (available from D.C. Law Review).
65. 42 U.S.C. §1437. Clients may mention a third program called the Tenant Assistance Program
(TAP). The District equivalent of the Section 8 program, TAP placements were suspended indefinitely in
December 1988, and the District has no plans to issue any new certificates.
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household's rent at thirty percent of its income.66 Although DPAH administers
both programs locally, federal law governs how the localities operate their waiting
lists, rent and calculations, and other fundamental matters.
1.

The Legal Frameworkfor the Preference System

The USHA sets forth specific preferences that allow local public housing
authorities to depart from a strict chronological listing of applicants. 7 It allows
DPAH and other local housing authorities to give priority to three groups of
families: (1) those in "substandard" housing; (2) those paying more than fifty
percent of household income in rent; and (3) those "involuntarily displaced" due to
a natural disaster or threat of domestic violence. The Cranston-Gonzalez National

Affordable Housing Act of 19908 clarifies that the first of these priority categories
includes homeless families69 and "families whose children are in or at risk for
70
placement in foster care."
Exercising its authority to rank groups within these federal preferences, the
District gives homeless families the highest possible priority and thus allows them
to receive housing before the other groups that also receive preferences.71 At the
same time, however, the District uses a limited definition of "homelessness." Only
66. Section 8 assistance can take two forms: (1)subsidies for use at apartments where the landlord has
a pre-existing relationship with the Section 8 program are known as "project-based" assistance or assistance
that is "attached to a structure," and (2) vouchers or certificates that a low-income tenant may take to any
private landlord who will accept them are considered "tenant-based" and are often referred to as "movable"
or "walk-around" subsidies. In each case, the government will subsidize the difference between what the
household pays (based upon 30% of its income) and the market or contract rent that the landlord charges.
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (public housing) and § 1437f (Section 8 housing), and accompanying
regulations, 24 C.F.R. 960.211 (public housing) and 24 C.F.R. 887.157 (Section 8).
68. Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990).
69. Id. § 501, 42 U.S.C.S. 1437d(c)(4)(A)(i) (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1993).
70. H.R. Rep. No. 101-943, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 440-41 (1990) (emphasis added). The National
Affordable Housing Act of 1990 also created a separate Family Unification Program intended to provide fiveyear Section 8 rental certificates specifically for income-eligible families at risk of separation or delayed
reunification. Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 553 (1990), 42 U.S.C.S. 1437f(x) (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1993).
The District is not able to utilize this program, however, because Congress initially did not provide any
funding for the program and more recently has made only eleven states eligible for the program. See CHILD
WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA FAMILY UNIFICATION PROGRAM (available from D.C. Law Review).
71. DPAH places three families from the District's shelter system into public housing for each nonhomeless family it admits. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
COMPREHENSIVE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY STRATEGY (CHAS), 83 (75% of the families placed into public
housing from October 1, 1988, through June 30, 1990, were homeless families in District-operated shelters).
The District has set forth the details of its homeless family preference through correspondence with HUD
rather than regulation (correspondence available from D.C. Law Review).
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those living in District-operated shelters may qualify for the preference. As a
result, families who are sheltered by the District, but not those who are in private
shelters or sharing quarters with friends or family, have a greatly increased
likelihood of obtaining public housing.
The District must apply this federal preference system to fifty percent of its
public housing units and project-based Section 8 certificates, and to ninety percent
of its tenant-based Section 8 certificates.7 2 For the remaining subsidies, DPAH
may fill units and administer its waiting list according to a local preference
system.7 1 In this local system, the District has made separated families a priority.'
District regulations provide that several groups shall be considered "priority
applicants" for public housing. In addition to persons who are involuntarily
displaced or live in uninhabitable housing, these groups include: (1) "family
members who have been separated from one another by judicial order because of
inadequate dwelling conditions," and (2) "households referred by the Department
of Human Services as having emergency housing needs related to special health,
disability or inadequate shelter conditions. 17 5 Either of these categories could
include families in the neglect system seeking reunification.
In apparent contrast to the relatively objective federal system, the District's
local priority framework grants the DPAH director broad discretion to determine
which families qualify for priority status in this manner. The regulations state that
the Director should take into account "severity of need, immediacy of need, the
general public interest to be served, and the availability of units" in determining
whether a family has an "emergency housing need. 170 While this broad range of
discretion may be problematic in some instances, it also makes clear that the
DPAH Director has the authority to provide a unit ordered pursuant to a housing
72. See supra note 66 for distinction between project- and tenant-based certificates. In 1992. Congress
reduced the number of project-based certificates that had to be awarded according to the federal preference
system from 70% to 50%. 42 US.CS. § 1437f(d)(l)(A)(i) (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1993).
73. There is some question whether DPAH has satisfied the federal requirements that allow a local
housing authority to utilize local preferences only after a public hearing has been held and it has made a
determination that these preferences respond to local housing needs and priorities. These procedural
requirements have been more specific in recently enacted federal legislation. See Id. § 1437f(d)(I)(A)(ii).
74. Although the USHA does not dictate this local preference system, it authorizes local housing
authorities to give preferences to "families identified by local public agencies involved in proiding for the
welfare of children as having a lack of adequate housing that is a primary factor in the Imminent placement of
a child in foster care, or in preventing the discharge of a childfrom foster care and reunification with his or
her family." Id. §§ 1437d(c)(4)(A)(ii)(IlI), 1437f(d)(l)(a)(ii)(lll). It also encourages public housing
authorities to make dwellings available to such families. Id. § 1437d(o).
75. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14, § 6102.2.
76. Id. § 6102.3.
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motion.
2. The Preference System In Practice
Even though homeless families and families seeking reunification should receive
subsidized housing quickly, they frequently do not. Subsidized housing is available
to only a very limited number of the thousands of District residents who need
housing assistance. Over 11,000 households are on the waiting list for public
housing." DPAH has committed itself to place thirty homeless families a month
into public housing.78 As a result, families that do not receive a priority on the
waiting list can wait for eight to ten years for a unit. Even for those homeless
families entitled to the highest preference, the delay before obtaining housing can
be as long as two years.
Other factors also contribute to the delay. In many cases, families do not receive
preferences to which they are entitled. Families that become homeless, for
example, frequently do not know to report this change in status. Similarly, DPAH
intake workers can fail to ask whether a family member is disabled or about other
information related to waiting list priority. Further, a family that needs a unit size
that is most in demand will wait far longer than a family seeking a smaller or
larger unit. Pursuant to DPAH regulations that restrict the number of people who
may occupy a particular sized unit,79 DPAH actually maintains a separate waiting
list for each unit size. Two- and three-bedroom units historically have the longest
waiting lists.80
E. Public Housing Vacancies
The courts 1 and other institutions involved in the neglect system have

77. See Attachment to Letter from Ray Price, Director of DPAH, to Mr. C. W. Hargrove, Chairperson
of ANC 2D, 4 (Sept. 14, 1992) (11,396 applicants on waiting list).
78. CHAS, supra note 71, at 83 (available from D.C. Law Review).
79. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14, § 6103.2.
80. Practitioners may wish to obtain information about the household's place on the waiting list and the
probable wait before the family will receive subsidized housing; the information is available from the Client
Services Branch of DPAH's Property Management Administration. They may also wish to determine whether
the client has a rent arrearage since DPAH frequently claims that a family cannot obtain another public
housing unit until the arrearage is paid. This may be done by acquiring the "PMA Tenant File" which
contains all documentation regarding a client's tenancy.
81. In re T.B. and Y.B., No. 468-88 and 469-88, 17 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 11,1992) ("issue of fairness
to other applicants").
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repeatedly expressed concern that the provision of housing will simply deprive
other deserving applicants of the District's limited housing resources. This
equitable concern does not recognize that the District allows more than 2,200
public housing units to remain vacant even though it has over S158 million in
available and unspent funds to repair them. The District has the resources to
satisfy the needs of homeless and near-homeless families in the neglect system and
other deserving applicants."2
Based upon October 1992 vacancy reports, at least 2,211 of 11,796 units are
vacant-a vacancy rate of almost twenty percent.8 3 In contrast, HUD expects
public housing agencies to keep this rate below three percent. 8' To put these
statistics in perspective, these units would house all of the homeless families
currently residing in the District's shelters if the public housing units were
available for occupancy. 5
According to federal audits, commission inquiries, and District financial
statements, this vacancy rate does not result from a lack of funds. The District has
over $69 million in federal funds and $89 million in District revenues earmarked
for public housing repairs and renovation that are available but unspent. 80 Instead,
this vacancy rate results from DPAH's inability to perform repairs of its housing
stock in a timely and thorough manner.
Even though HUD guidelines suggest that "minor" repairs should be carried out
in one to five days and "moderate" repairs in five to twenty days, it took DPAH
266 days on the average to carry out minor repairs as of 1990.7 HUD estimates
82. Homeless and near-homeless families on the public housing waiting list recently filed suit against the
District of Columbia regarding this situation. Finding a likelihood of success on the merit Judge Steffen
Graae appointed a special master to make recommendations as to how DPAH can be brought into substantial
compliance with applicable HUD laws and regulations. Pearson v. Kelly, No. 92-CAi4030 (D.C. Super. Ct.
May 24, 1993) (order available from D.C. Law Review).
83. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AND ASSISTED HOUSING. SUMMtIARY OF VACANCIES (1992) (with supparting
documentation) (available from D.C. Law Review).
84. See 24 C.F.R. § 990.109(b) and § 990.118 (1992). If vacancy rates exceed 3%, the public housing
agency must submit to HUD a Comprehensive Occupancy Plan (COP) for reaching a 3% vacancy rate within
five years. Id. HUD initially refused to approve DPAH's COP for fiscal year 1990 (FY 90) becaus it
attempted to reduce the rate only marginally-to 19 %.
85. In the winter of 1991-1992, the District had over 600 families residing in shelter. SuWt
,AY OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA's COMMISSION ON SOCIAL SERVICES (Jan. 15. 1992) (available from D.C. Law
Review).
86. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, HUD, AUDIT REPORT (Sept. 30. 1992) (S69 million in federal
funds); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT. FY93 CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN-A NEsv START 73 (S89.9
million in District funds).
87. D.C. COMMISSION ON BUDGET PRIORITIES. COMMM.sION ON PUBLIC WORKS AND Ecosowc
ANALYSIS. ISSUE ANALYSIS--MANAGEMENT
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that half (forty-nine percent) of the units needing minor or moderate repairs have
been unoccupied for more than a year with at least some being vacant since
1981. 8 For the modernization projects funded by HUD's Comprehensive
Improvement Assistance Program (CIAP), DPAH has failed to obligate almost
$50 million in CIAP funds received between 1976 and 1989,89 and HUD is seeking
to recover an additional $3 million because work performed has not complied with
appropriate regulations.9
Concerns about the fairness of elevating families in the neglect system above
others on the waiting list are understandable. However, in this situation, the
District has available housing resources but has failed to utilize them
appropriately. In such circumstances, it is unfair to penalize families in the neglect
system who need housing to prevent separation or to facilitate reunification for the
District's problems. The District's ready supply of vacant public housing provides a
significant source of units for families in the neglect system and other deserving
applicants.

PROGRAMS 118.

88. This occurs in large part because the District allows maintenance staff to perform regular minor or
moderate repairs on an overtime basis rather than filling staff positions. In FY 1990, for example, DPAH paid
$1.02 million in overtime labor costs while allowing 34% of all budgeted positions to remain unfilled.
Similarly, as of January 1991, DPAH employed only one roofer for its entire housing stock, only one
electrician for every 2,983 units (despite 2,892 pending work orders), and only one plasterer for every 477
units (despite 17,162 pending work orders). See B. Johnson, Acting Director, DPAH, Memorandum, Request
for DPAH to Be Exempt From Hiring Freeze 2 (Jan. 15, 1991).
89. A November 1990 report found $48,913,202 in CIAP funds approved but not expended up to and
including FY 1989. Terrie Saunders, Memorandum, Month 13.1 Capitol and ClAP Funds-Expenditure
Reports (Nov. 7, 1990).
90. Due in large part to DPAH's failure to remedy public housing vacancies, HUD has designated
DPAH a "troubled agency" which means that HUD must approve an annual Memorandum of Agreement
setting forth performance standards before DPAH can receive federal funds. HUD's District Manager has
stated in a letter that recapped ten years of consistent warnings and findings of deficiencies:
(The operation of DPAH] is a disgraceful example of what should not happen in public housing .... An
incredible amount of lip service has been given to the condition of public housing as a top priority of the
City's administrative efforts .... Programmatic events have not paralleled this ideology. Far too many
people are being denied the right to a safe, decent, and sanitary living environment. In far too many
instances, public housing and the term "drug haven" have interchangeable connotations.
Letter from I. Margaret White, District Manager, HUD, to Marion Barry, Mayor of the District of Columbia
3 (March 20, 1989).
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CONCLUSION

In child abuse and neglect cases, it is sometimes necessary to remove children
from their families, at least temporarily. This separation is difficult enough even
when warranted. Far too many families, however, endure needless separation
because of the lack of adequate and affordable housing. Both the PCANA and the
AAA recognize the harm that occurs when children are kept from their families.
Accordingly, these statutes mandate that the District provide services, including
housing, to assist these families to remain or become unified. Such statutory
mandates are an important step in the efforts of families in the neglect system to
obtain permanent housing rather than face continued, unnecessary separation.

